I made clear that the dispute between me and those who hold DRCD concerns the contributions complex demonstratives make to propositions expressed by sentences (relative to contexts) in which they occur. According to DRCD, complex demonstratives contribute individuals to propositions (relative to contexts). By contrast, on the quantificational semantics for demonstratives I defend, complex demonstratives contribute to propositions (relative to contexts) semantic values of the sort other quantifiers contribute.
In two recent papers, Nathan Salmon has criticized part of my argument against DRCD (Salmon 2006a, notes 11 and 13, and Salmon 2006b, appendix) . 3 
I shall show that Salmon's criticism fails. I'll also show that the version of DRCD that Salmon ends up endorsing is false. 4 Before turning to Salmon's objection, it will be helpful to rehearse what I take to be some obvious methodological points. Let's distinguish occurrences of expressions in sentences from the expressions themselves. So, for example, the expression 'that car' has two occurrences in the sentence

That car is nicer than that car.
Now suppose someone proposes a semantic theory of some expression (or some sort of expression-for example, complex demonstratives). Surely one way to criticize this semantic theory would be to point out that it gives no account, or no proper account, of the semantics of certain occurrences of the (sort of) expression in question.
5 For example, suppose 11 and 13 in Salmon 2006a. Indeed, Salmon 2006a is virtually identical to a large proper part of Salmon 2006b. 4. As we'll see, I'll just review the arguments given in CD that show Salmon's view is incorrect. As I discuss below, Salmon (2006a Salmon ( , 2006b ) curiously ignores those arguments. fixed. In CD and here, I discuss what I call classic demonstrative, NDNS, and QI uses of complex demonstratives (see CD, Salmon (2006a Salmon ( , 2006b , who is concerned with "occurrence-based semantic theories." In his discussion of my QI uses of complex demonstratives, Salmon (2006a Salmon ( , 2006b 12. As we'll see, this is the strategy Salmon (2006a Salmon ( , 2006b Salmon (2006a, 272-73n11; 2006b, 446-47) Salmon 2006b, 427] . But Salmon at least sketches how an assignment of ["bondage"] contents to expressions relative to the same parameters Salmon (2006a, note 11; 2006b, 446) Kaplan's 'dthat' terms. 22. See CD, [74] [75] [76] [77] Salmon's (2006b, 434n21): In particular, that demonstratives are singular terms is common sense, and no persuasive evidence has been adduced that they are quantifiers. Salmon's version, fails to properly (see CD, (48) (49) (50) 
The appendix of Salmon 2006b is virtually identical to the conjunction of notes
When we talk about the semantic values (extensions, contents, and so forth) of occurrences of contextually sensitive expressions, as I will, we need the notion of an occurrence of an expression taken relative to a context. When I suppress contexts and talk of semantic values of occurrences of expressions simpliciter, I do so either because the expressions aren't contextually sensitive or because I am taking the context to be
. of a variable, under an assignment of values to variables, is simply the variable's designatum (the assigned value)." This is a claim to the effect that the semantic content of a variable-the expression-relative to an assignment of values to variables is just the assigned value. But Salmon (ibid., 430) then says about the semantic content of free occurrences of variables "what we have been calling 'the [semantic] content of [the expression] "x"' under a value assignment is . . . the [semantic] content of its free occurrences." Salmon here identifies the semantic contents of variables-the expressions-under assignments with the semantic contents of free occurrences of variables under assignments. So Salmon allows that free occurrences of variables are directly referential (that is, have as their semantic contents relative to value assignments their assigned values). Salmon (ibid., 447) then allows that bound occurrences of variables are not directly referential when he says that the claims K (and K2
)
is understood in this stipulative way, given that one accepts the stipulation, the argument is sound. But note how weak the conclusion is (understood as the claim that complex demonstrativesthe expressions-are not directly referential). It is consistent with the claim that some occurrences of complex demonstratives are directly referential! After all, according to the stipulation K2, we call expressions 'directly referential' only when all their occurrences are. Hence on this usage, an expression could fail to be directly referential even if some of its occurrences are directly referential. But the conclusion of ADR should be exactly this strong. The conclusion, in effect, is that at least some occurrences of complex demonstratives are not directly referential. And examples like 5 do show this. Hence the conclusion of ADR, coupled with the claim that DRCD does not give any account of occurrences of complex demonstratives (like the one in 5) that aren't directly referential, shows that DRCD is at least incomplete. As I said above, what I take to be the refutation of DRCD has to also include arguing against ambiguity approach DRCD+'s according to which DRCD applies to certain occurrences of complex demonstratives, and some other account applies to occurrences such as that in 5. And as I said, I give that argument in chapter 5 of CD. What examples like 5 show by themselves is that of which he rejects, have "extremely dubious consequences . . . assuming that a bound variable, since its semantic content is not the variable's customary designatum, is not a 'directly referential occurrence.' (This is how both King and
kissed'). I find the semantics Salmon provides interesting and have no objections to it. (The semantics Salmon provides assigns as semantic values ["bondage"] extensions to expressions relative to m-tuples of variables under assignments of values to variables [see
Salmon is incorrect. DRCD+, including
